Why Does Majority Rule Mean

Rabbi Solomon Ephraim of Lonshitz (Keli Yakar, Deut. 17:2) applies the same statement to the legal decision of a judge in a case before him. In his view, there are two-way considerations, and there is no absolute rule of pure or impure, permissible or forbidden. Therefore, when a court decides, we must always rely on its decisions; The Court has ruled in accordance with the intellectual discretion of the majority of its members, which gives binding validity to their opinion. However, this does not detract from the essential truth of the opposing opinion per se. Rabbi Jehiel Michal Epstein (Aruch ha-Shulḥan, Ḥm, introduction; At the beginning of the 20th century) sees diversity of opinion as the glory of the Torah. He likens it to a chorus of many voices: The workings of majority rule were well illustrated when the election of Thomas Jefferson as president was accepted as sufficient justification for refusing to approve federalist changes in the judicial system. The majority rule is somewhat limited by the Constitution. Civil liberties are expressly protected by the Basic Law and cannot be suppressed by a temporary majority. The Constitution itself cannot be amended without the consent of three-fourths (thirty-eight) of the states. Because of constitutional guarantees of free speech, the press, and other freedoms, minority groups in the United States can oppose the majority.

Criticism of minorities and the pervasive possibility of the minority becoming the majority have contributed to the proper functioning of majority rule. Deciding by numbers is a convenient way to manage differences. In a dictatorship, differences do not matter; One person`s opinion matters. At the other end of the spectrum, consensus means that every decision requires everyone`s consent. This process works well in small groups, but at the state and federal levels, it would cause the government to move even slower than it currently does. The majority rule allows a decision-making body to continue its work as soon as more than half of the participants are satisfied. Validity of the majority principle. Various authors have argued that the nature of democratic ethics requires that the will (vote) of a simple majority always prevails over opposition. Any other rule, they demand, puts a minority in a position to frustrate a majority and thus govern one way. Consequently, the logical and only legitimate derivation of the egalitarian and democratic hypothesis is considered a simple rule of the majority.

Election theorists have often argued that cycling leads to crippling instability. [1] Buchanan and Tullock argue that unanimity is the only decision rule that guarantees economic efficiency. [1] Schmitz and Tröger (2012) consider a collective electoral problem with two alternatives and show that majority rule maximizes utilitarian well-being under all incentive-compatible voting rules, both anonymous and neutral, provided that the types of voters are independent. [6] However, if voters` utilities are stochastically correlated, other rules of dominant strategy choice may yield better results than majority rule. Azrieli and Kim (2014) extend the case analysis of independent types to asymmetric environments and taking into account anonymous and non-anonymous rules. [7] Even if the individual opinion was not accepted in the first place and the majority did not agree with the person, a later generation may emerge, the majority of which may agree with the person`s opinion, and then the question is decided in accordance with their opinion. The whole Torah was transmitted to Moses in this way: there are considerations that must be purified and considerations that must be made impure. (Moses) was told: How much time will we have to deal with each situation? He told them, “The rule is the majority; but both opinions are the words of the living God. According to this interpretation, there is no absolute and unequivocal rule.

In any case, there are several considerations. While the final decision in halakhic decision-making is actually determined by the majority, another majority might come to a different conclusion at another time. Before the Supreme Court of the State of Israel, this justification for the quotation of minority opinions – based on the sources cited above – was presented as an explanation of the crucial need to present minority opinions in the fundamental judgments of the courts (Fh 13/80 Hendeles v. Bank Kuppat Ha`am 35 (2) 785, p. 796; hc 669/85 Kahane v. Knesset Speaker, 40 (4) 393, 404-420 by Justice Menachem Elon). In the case of a court, it has been determined that a majority decision is not binding if not all judges have participated in the proceedings and the judgment is that of the majority of the full supplement (Sanh 5:5). Some scholars have concluded that even a municipal decree adopted by a majority is not binding, unless the minority participated in the proceedings (Rashba, vol. 2 or no.

104; Maharik, or No. 180; Maharit, vol. 1, or no. 58). Given that this decision, if followed, could allow the minority to impose its will on the majority by staying out of community discussions, it was determined over time that the majority`s decision should be enforceable despite the minority`s non-participation in the discussions that led to it. The researchers supported the conclusion either by assuming that the absent minority implicitly agrees to accept the decision of the majority making an effort to participate (Mishpat Shalom, No. 231; ibid., Kunteres Tikkun Olam, “vav”), or on the grounds that the minority implicitly delegates its power to the majority (Hatam Sofer, Ḥm or No. 116); Some scholars also refer to the custom of supporting the majority rule in municipal legislation (Mabit, vol.

1 and No. 264 respectively). If the community has delegated powers to its representatives, they decide by majority, but only if the minority is also present (Penei Moshe, vol. 2, or No. 110; Birkei Yosef, Ḥm 13:7). Unfortunately, these two variants of majority rule often lead to very different results, a troubling contradiction with the concept of democracy: the electoral mechanism used in the election, not the attitudes and beliefs of the electorate, may well be the deciding factor in deciding who wins. The philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that allowing the body politic to elect its own government would provide a government that cared about the common good of all voters, a concept he described as the general will in his 1762 work On the Social Contract. But when election results depend at least as much on electoral systems as on the will of the body politic, the notion of democratic elections that provide an infallible general will becomes suspect. In response to this problem, social choice theorist William H.